We study Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior under restriction on zerosum games. We show that interchangeability of choice behavior is the only additional condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general noncooperative games with respect to testable implications. This observation implies that in some sense interchangeability is not only a necessary but also a sufficient property which differentiates zero-sum games.
SangMok Lee

SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1303
May 2009 1 Introduction Sprumont (2000) investigates an abstract joint choice problem without assuming an explicit economic environment. He assumes that the joint behavior is simultaneous and is captured as a tuple of actions where each action is chosen by a player. Sprumont provides conditions on the testable implications such that observed joint behavior is a Nash equilibrium behavior if and only if it satisfies these conditions. They are similar to classical axioms of choice theory (see Moulin (1985) ).
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Figure 1: Nash-rationalizable but not with zero-sum games
In this example, player 1 can conceivably choose either U or D and player 2 may choose L or R. However, following classical choice theory, we observe how players choose when choice sets are restricted. Figure 1 shows all the possible games from which two players may choose their joint actions. For each game, * is the action profile chosen by two players. We can verify that the joint choice behavior exhibited in Figure 1 is consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior of a coordination game in which coordinating to (U, L) or (D, R) gives a higher payoff to both players.
However, this choice function cannot be Nash equilibrium behavior by any zero-sum game. Assuming that the choices are Nash-equilibria of a zero-sum game, we have that {(U, L), (U, R)}, for player 1, (D, R) is strictly preferred to (U, R); for player 2, (U, L)is strictly preferred to (U, R), which implies player 1 strictly prefers (U, R) to (U, L). As a result, these cyclic preference orders imply that all possible joint actions are indeed indifferent for player 1 (and thus player 2 by the fact that the game is zero-sum). Therefore, we would expect to see all strategy profiles chosen.
This example shows that once we have two choices on the diagonals in a table of joint actions, in order for the joint choice function to be Nash equilibrium behavior with a zero-sum game, the other pairs of actions also should be chosen. When a choice behavior has the property that any pair of actions chosen, one for each player, is also jointly chosen, we say that the choice behavior is interchangeable. Our main theorem
shows that this interchangeability of joint choice behavior is indeed the only additional condition that distinguishes the testable implications of zero-sum games from those of general non-cooperative games.
Since Samuelson introduced his analysis of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938) , there have been a considerable number of research studies on the testable implications of individual decision making. However, compared to the history and popularity of game theory and the research devoted to refining solution concepts, the falsifiability of game theoretic models has received scant attention. More recently, there have been several studies on the testable implications of collective decision-making such as household behavior (Chiappori, 1988 ) and general equilibrium model (Brown and Matzkin, 1996) .
In game theoretic setup, while Sprumont (2000) deals with simultaneous joint decisionmaking, and therefore normal form games, Ray and Zhou (2001) consider the case in which all observed joint choices involve sequential movement by players. They derive conditions the choice behavior needs to satisfy in order to coincide with subgame perfect Nash equilibria under complete information. Subsequent work by Ray and Snyder (2003) has consolidated these two independent rationalizability concepts into one con-dition, which they call subgame-perfect consistency. For further references, we refer to Carvajal, Ray, and Snyder (2004) .
The following section begins with a brief summary of Sprumont (2000) and states the additional condition for Nash-rationalization with zero-sum games. Section 3 discusses possible difficulties in extensions of the main theorem and Appendix A is devoted to the proof of the main theorem.
Model and main theorem
There are two players, 1 and 2. Let In the case where at most one player has more than one available action in B, we say B is in a line. Depending on the player, the line is either a column or a row -the former when player 1 has choices, the latter when player 2 has choices. In addition, for
• Persistent under Contraction (PC):
With these two conditions, Sprumont (2000) establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 4 A joint choice function f is Nash-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies (PE) and (PC).
2
From this model of Nash-rationalizability, we restrict the set of available rationalizing games from the set of all non-cooperative games to include only zero-sum games. Under the conditions of zero-sum games, the preferences of two players conflict in the opposite direction. Therefore, while a general non-cooperative game consists of two weak orders, we can describe zero-sum games with a single weak order. As demonstrated in Example 1, not all Nash-rationalizable joint choice functions are Nash-rationalizable with zero-sum games. In the example, we need at least one additional 2 In Sprumont (2000), this theorem holds for any n-agent joint choice.
3 Let be a binary relation over A. Inverse relation is defined as, For all a, b ∈ A for which a b, b a. Later, we will use the fact that the inverse relation of a weak order is also a weak order. The proof is straightforward by definition.
condition which fills the gap in the product space of two distinct choices in the diagonal of the game table. This condition requires that the joint choice function is interchangeable.
Definition 6 (Interchangeable choice function) A joint choice function f over A is interchangeable if for all B ∈ A and all b * , b
Provided that agents play a zero-sum game and observed joint actions are the Nashequilibria of the corresponding subgame, the choice function is interchangeable. It is well-known that any pair of equilibrium strategies of a zero-sum game, one for each player, is an equilibrium strategy profile (see Luce and Raiffa (1957) ). Our contribution is to show that interchangeable choice behavior is indeed the only additional condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games. The following theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 7 A joint choice function defined on a set of two-agent actions is Nashrationalizble with a zero-sum game if and only if it satisfies (PE), (PC), and interchangeability.
Proof : See Appendix A.
Discussion
Sprumont only applies (PC2) for each line. Its only function is to guarantee transitivity.
From this observation, Sprumont introduces "quasi Nash-rationalizability" where a choice function agrees with the set of Nash-equilibria of (B, ( 1 , 2 )) for all B ∈ A, in which ( i ) i=1,2 are P-acyclic binary relations on A (possibly non-transitive).
4 He proves that a joint choice function is quasi Nash-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies (PE), (PC1).
However, the following example shows that (PE), (PC1), and interchangeability are not enough to induce quasi Nash-rationalizability with zero-sum games.
Example 8
5 Figure 2 describes a choice function f over all binary choices in A. The left figure is for adjacent actions in the table and the right figure is for other binary choices. For each column, a solid arrow implies that only one action is chosen against the other; a dashed line implies that both are chosen. For example, {b} = f ({b, a 6 }) and {a 2 , c} = f ({a 2 , c}).
For each row, the arrow describes the choice inversely: e.g.
Assuming that f satisfies (PE) and (PC1), we can verify the choice values for each 2 × 2 subgames. 6 For other subgames, There is no simpler example with length less than 6. Note that we do not need (PC2) to rule out a PR-cycle with length 4; P-cycle is a special case of PR-cycle. If we have P-cycle with length of 5, we can reduce the cycle and generate a PR-cycle with length of 4. But again, this is ruled out by (PE), (PC1) and interchangeability.
6 If we illustrate them, {a
This choice function satisfies (PE), (PC1) and interchangeability. If we assume that the choice function is Nash-rationalizable with a zero-sum game, (A, , ), the choice function should agree with over all binary choices. However, have a P-cycle, a 1 ≻ a 2 ≻ · · · ≻ a 6 ≻ a 1 . Thereby the choice function can not be Nash-rationalizable with any P-acyclic relation.
Note that (PE) and (PC1) guarantees that individual choices are P-acyalic. In a general non-cooperative game, this is enough to guarantee the existence of P-acyclic relations ( i ) i∈1,2 which rationalize the choice function. However, if we assume the game is zero-sum, binary choices of one agent directly imply the relation of the other agent.
This effect induces a possible P-cycle across agents.
It is also restrictive to require observations for all possible subgames when we apply these testable implications. A natural relaxation is to assume that a choice function is defined on A ′ ⊂ A. However, Sprumont comments on the difficulties in Nashrationalizability under incomplete observations. Without conditions for rationalizability by general non-cooperative games, it looks even harder to find conditions for rationalizability with zero-sum games.
In classical choice theory, the congruence condition has been studied for incomplete observations (see Richter (1971) ). In particular, congruency is defined as the following.
Definition 9 For B ⊂ 2 X and a choice function c :
For all x, y ∈ X, xR ′ y if ∃B ∈ B such that {x, y} ⊂ B and x ∈ c(B).
If R ′ is consistent, then the choice function is called congruent. For individual choice behavior, Richter proves that a choice function is rationalizable by a weak order if and only if it is congruent. However, the following example shows that a naive extension of the congruence condition does not solve the incomplete observation problem in joint behavior.
Example 10 (Individually congruent but not Nash-ratioinalizable) The conceivable game is 2×3 where agent 1 can choose in {U, D} and agent 2 can choose in {L, M, R}.
Three figures show the only three observed games and the choices from them.
Individually congruent but not Nash-rationalizable
Assuming that the choice function satisfies (PC), we get This study still leaves out several issues arising from the characteristics of zero-sum games. The first thing to note is that the proof relies on the existence of choice for all B ∈ A. Considering that we verify the choice is Nash-rationalizable, this implies that all subgames are required to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no theoretical conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite zero-sum game. Considering the absence of conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibrium, an obvious direction of research would investigate either mixed strategies or correlated strategies. However, necessary and sufficient conditions for mixed or correlated strategy rationalizability are also unknown.
lines. Before we proceed with the construction of the weak order over A, we need some preliminary definitions.
Definition 11 (Consistent relation) Let R be a relation over X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l , . . . } and P be the strict counterpart of R. A sequence
is called a PR-cycle (or a cycle). If a relation does not have any cycle, we say that it is consistent.
8 In individual choice theory, given a finite alternative set X = {x, y, . . . } and a choice function g, Sen (1971) defines base-relation(R * ) as xR * y if and only if x ∈ g({x, y}) If we arrange player 1's conceivable actions in a column and player 2's actions in a row, thereby constructing a table of joint actions, * represents the base-relation in each column and * * represents the base relation in each row in the table, except * * is defined inversely as compared to the convention.
Definition 12 (Extension) Given any arbitrary binary relation
In the following, we show that is consistent, and any weak order extension of Nash-rationalizes the joint choice function with a zero-sum game.
Lemma 13 is consistent.
Proof of Lemma 13 Suppose by means of contradiction that there exists {a
Since is the union of two disjoint sets, * and * * , depending on whether {a i , a j } is in a column or a row, is either * or * * . Figure 3 . Here, the dashed arrows and the solid arrow represent the links in the cycle as in Figure 2 .
Proof by induction argument requires the steps described below here. Steps 1 to 3 give relations over a subset of B (Figure 10 ), and step 4 shows another subsets of 9 Note that * * is defined inversely. relations over B (Figure 12 -(ii)).
Step 5 induces the contradiction of these relations over two subsets.
Step 1: Consider the subgame {a 2n−3 , a 2n−2 , a 2n−1 , b 1 }. In addition to the known relations from the cycle, we can verify f ({a 2n−3 , b 1 }) and f ({b 1 , a 2n−1 )}. The four cases in Figure 6 below contain all possible cases of f ({a 2n−3 , b 1 }) and f ({b 1 , a 2n−1 )}. In these two subgames, it must not be the case that either a 2n−3 ∈ f ({a 2n−3 , b 1 }) and (fig (ii) ). and by transitivity of * * in the bottom row. These two relations induce the cycle
induces a 2n−2 and b 1 are in f ({a 2n−3 , a 2n−2 , a 2n−1 , b 1 }), and indeed all four joint actions are in f ({a 2n−3 , a 2n−2 , a 2n−1 , b 1 }) provided that f is interchangeable. Therefore, we have an indifference relation ∼ in {a 2n−3 , b 1 } and {b 1 , a 2n−1 }, which gives a special case of (i).
Excluding case (i) and (ii), either (iii) or (iv) is true. We will prove that the induction step is true in case (iii) and omit the case of (iv). The proof that the induction argument is true under case (iv) is omitted here as it can be shown with exactly the same approach as that taken with case (iii). Step 2: Figure 7 contains every possible case of f ({a 2n−4 , c}) and f ({c, a 2n−2 }). Using the same argument that used for the case (i), (ii) of f ({a 2n−3 , b 1 }) and f ({b 1 , a 2n−1 }),
we can rule out the cases of (i) and (ii). In addition, case (iii), a 2n−4 = f ({a 2n−4 , c}) and c = f ({c, a 2n−2 }), is not possible, either. This can be shown first by observing Step 3: Considering f ({a 2n−5 , d}) and f ({d, a 2n−3 }), we can rule out the cases of ei-
& f ({c, a 2n−2 }) in the previous steps. Accordingly, we only have cases of either a 2n Figure 9 , respectively. However, case (i) is ruled out, because once we By applying steps 2 and 3 sequentially, we can verify more relations. Figure 10 summarizes the result of this process. In the following, step 4 is only for the cycle whose length is greater than or equal to 8. For a cycle with length of 6, we already have all the relations that we need to verify in step 4.
Step 4: Denote the joint action (a 
Claim 14 For any
Proof : We prove this claim by induction. Note that we already assumed that this is true for b 1 in step 2. Proof : Considering the subgames, {τ (b 2 ), b 2 } and {b 2 , a 2n−1 } (see Figure 11) , it must not be the case that τ (b (fig (ii) ) and in the latter case, in order not to have a cycle with length 6, f must give b 2 ≻ * * a 2n−1 (fig (iii) 
then it must be true that τ (b
(Note again that * * is defined inversely). Therefore, (iii) must be the case in 10 Although we explicitly write the proof only for the case of cycle begins with * * , every single step so far could have been reproduced in cases where cycles begin with ≻ * , analogously. Here, we used the induction hypothesis, 'there is no cycle of length 2(n − 1)', from the counterpart proof of cycles begin with * and have a strong relation as ≻ * * Step 5: Results from steps 2 and 3 and results from step 4 contradict each other. 2 ) as e (see Figure 13 ), then step 2 and 3 gives e ≻ * a 1 and e ≻ * * τ (b n−2 ). We showed in step 4 that b n−2 ≻ * τ (b n−2 ) and b n−2 ≻ * * a 2n−1 . Moreover, it must be true that e ≻ * a 2n , otherwise, a 2n * e ≻ * * a 4 shortens the cycle. On the other hand, b n−2 ≻ * * a 2n , by transitivity of * * in the bottom row. Lastly, we can observe that any choice from the subgame, {e, τ (b n−2 ), a 2n , b n−2 }, violates (PC), and this contradiction completes the proof of step 5, thereby completing the proof of Lemma 13.
